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THE TWENTY-FffiST ANNUAL 
KENNETH J. HODSON LECTURE 
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 
IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS* 
PAUL C. GIANNELLI** 
It is an honor to have been invited to give the Kenneth J. 
Hodson Lecture in Criminal Law. I had the privilege of serving 
l.mder General Hodson while on active duty. My talk today is about 
scientific evidence, and it is based on my research in this area. 
I. Increased Use of Scientific Evidence 
Scientific and expert evidence is playing an ever-increasing 
and far more important role in criminal prosecutions than in the 
past. 
A. Notorious Trials 
A quick look at well-publicized trials over the past decade 
illustrates this point. In his book on the Claus von Bulow 
prosecution, Alan Dershowitz wrote, "At bottom the case against 
Claus von Bulow was a scientific case. It would have to be refuted 
by scientific evidence."l Similarly, the trial of Ted Bundy, the serial 
killer, involved the use of hypnotically-refreshed testimony and bite 
mark evidence.z Fiber evidence proved critical in the trial of Wayne 
Williams for the murder of two of the thirty young black males 
killed in Atlanta in the late 1970's.3 Pathology and serology 
*This article is a transcript of a lecture delivered by the author to members 
of the Staff and Faculty, their distinguished guests, and officers attending the 
40th Graduate Course and the 127th Judge Advocate Officers Basic Course, at 
The Judge Advocate General's School, Charlottesville, Virginia, on March 26, 
1992. The Kenneth J. Hodson Chair of Criminal Law was established on June 24, 
1971. Major General Hodson was The Judge Advocate General, U.S. Army, from 
1967 to 1971, and was a member of the original Staff and Faculty of The Judge 
Advocate General's School at Charlottesville, Virginia. 
**Albert J. Weatherhead Ill and Richard W. Weatherhead Professor of 
Law, Case Western Reserve University. 
1 A. DERSHOWlTZ, REVERSAL OF FORTUNE: INsiDE THE VON BULOW CASE 105 
(1986); see also State v. von Bulow, 475 A.2d 995 (R.I.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 875 
(1984). 
2Bundy v. State, 471 So. 2d 9, 18-19 (Fla. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 894 
(1986); Bundy v. State, 455 So. 2d 330, 348 (Fla. 1984), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1109 
(1986); see also R. LARsEN, BUNDY: THE DELmERATE STRANGER (1986); S. 
MICHAUD & H. AYNESWORTH, THE ONLY LIVING WITNESS (1983). 
3 Williams v. State, 251 Ga. 749, 312 S.E.2d 40 (1984); see also Deadman, 
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testimony played a pivotal role in the trial of Jean Harris for the 
murder of Dr. Tarnower, the Scarsdale Diet doctor.4 The forensic 
analysis of physical evidence was "at the core of the case" against 
Dr. Jeffrey MacDonald at Fort Bragg.5 In addition, "fingerprint, 
shoeprint, and ballistics evidence" was admitted in the "Night 
Stalker'' serial murder prosecution.6 
More recent examples can be taken from the December 23, 
1991, issue of Time magazine. One article on the assassination of 
President Kennedy, sparked by the movie JFK, discussed the 
"magic-bullet" theory-a theory which questioned whether the 
same bullet could have struck both President John F. Kennedy and 
Texas Governor John Connally. The article states that "[n]eutron 
activation tests indicate that the fragments in Connally's wrist did 
come from the bullet in question. "7 
Another story in the same issue concerned the recent Florida 
trial of William Kennedy Smith for rape. The article pointed out 
that during the investigation, the victim "passed two polygraph 
tests and a voice-stress analysis."8 That article, however, neglected 
to mention that most courts exclude polygraph evidence as 
unreliable, and virtually every reported case on voice-stress 
analysis has rejected it as invalid.9 
Fiber Evidence and the Wayne Williams Trial (Part l), 53 F.B.I. L. ENFORCEMENT 
BuLL. 12 (Mar. 1983); Deadman, Fiber Evidence and the Wayne Williams Trial 
(Conclusion), 53 F.B.I. L. ENFORCEMENT BULL. 10 (May 1984). 
4People v. Harris, 84 A.D.2d 63, 445 N.Y.S.2d 520 (1981), aft'd, 456 N.Y.2d 
694, 442 N.E.2d 1205 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1047 (1983). Eight pathologists 
testified; 20% of the trial was devoted to cutaneous histology. See Ackerman, The 
Physician as Expert Witness: Is Peer Review Needed?, I GENERICS 37, 52 (Dec. 
1985) ("The role of cutaneous histology in the trial of Jean Harris and its 
implications for medicine and the law in America should be of concern to the 
community of physicians"); TIME, Mar. 1, 1982, at 90 ("At the trial of Jean Harris 
last year [the expert] tried to persuade the jury-unsuccessfully-that blood 
marks jibed with Harris's claim that the shooting of Dr. Herman Tarnower 
occurred accidentally during a struggle"); see also S. ALEXANDER, VERY MucH A 
LADY: THE UNToLD STORY oF JEAN HARRis AND DR. HERMAN TARNOWER (1983); J. 
DAVID, SCARSDALE MURDER (1981). 
5J. McGINNiss, FATAL VISION 264 (1983). MacDonald was convicted for 
killing his wife and two children. See United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1 
(1982); United States v. MacDonald, 688 F.2d 224 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 
459 U.S. 1103 (1983); United States v. MacDonald, 779 F.2d 962 (4th Cir. 1985), 
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 813 (1986). 
6 Harris, Night Stalker Convicted of 13 Murders, U.P.I., Sept. 21, 1989. 
7 Corliss, Who Killed J.F.K?, TIME, Dec. 23, 1991, at 68; see also Weisburg 
v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 438 F. Supp. 492, 499-503 CD.D.C. 1977) (Freedom of 
Information Act request for lab results on Kennedy assassination). 
8 Booth, Palm Beach Trial: The Case That Was Not Heard, TIME, Dec. 23, 
1991, at 38. 
9 See P. GIANNELLI & lMwrNKELRIED, SciENTIFIC EVIDENCE, ch. 8 (1986). 
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B. Lack of Scientific Evidence 
Indeed, reliance on scientific proof has become so common 
that its absence in a particular case becomes noteworthy. A 1990 
news account of the Central Park jogger case commented, "Among 
the defense's strongest points in attacking the prosecution's case 
was the surprising absence of physical evidence-no weapons, no 
blood stains, no strands of hair, no pieces of skin, no footprints link 
any of the teenagers to the crimes."lO 
Another illustration is the recent acquittal of El Sayyid 
Nosair for the assassination of Rabbi Meir Kahane, the founder of 
the Jewish Defense League. Apparently, nobody saw the actual 
shooting. Witnesses, however, saw the defendant with a gun in the 
same room where the shooting occurred, heard at least one shot, 
and saw the defendant run from the scene. When the defendant 
was shot and apprehended nearby, a gun was found next to him. 
All this occurred within minutes of the shooting. Most prosecutors 
would consider this a powerful case. An alternate juror explained 
the jury's reasoning as follows: 
[Two shots were heard] but only one bullet was found 
and it was not tested for hair, blood or other indications 
that it had passed through the rabbi's neck, the fatal 
wound. 
. . . [T]he prosecution had offered no evidence of Mr. 
Nosair's fingerprints on the gun, no paraffin tests that 
might have shown Mr. Nosair fired it, and no evidence 
showing the bullet's trajectories.11 
C. Variety of Techniques 
We are not only using scientific proof more, but also relying 
on a wider variety of techniques. Neutron activation, atomic 
absorption, electrophoretic blood testing, scanning electron micros-
copy, mass spectrometry, and gas chromatography are but a few of 
the techniques now used in criminal prosecutions. Other examples 
include sound spectrometry (voiceprints), psycholinguistics, remote 
electromagnetic sensing, and horizontal gaze nystagmus. Even 
fingerprint identification has moved into the high-tech age with 
laser technology for visualizing latent prints and computers for far 
more powerful searching capability. In addition, the last decade 
10 Sherman, Technology Emotion Key in Jogger Case, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 20, 
1990, at 8; see also N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 20, 1990, at B4 ("The youths claimed not to 
have penetrated the jogger, and there was no clear physical proof that they had"). 
11 McFadden, For Jurors, Evidence in Kahane Case Was Riddled With Gaps, 
N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 23, 1991, at B1, col. 2. 
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has seen an increased reliance on social science research-often 
called syndrome evidence. For example, evidence of battered wife 
syndrome, rape trauma syndrome, and child sexual abuse accom-
modation syndrome now frequently is admitted at trial. 
II. Reasons for This Development 
Several factors may have contributed to this increased use of 
scientific evidence. 
A Research Funding 
At one time, funding for forensic science research was 
substantial. The creation of the Law Enforcement Assistance 
Administration (LEAA) in 1968 undoubtedly played a significant 
role. In the 1970's, the LEAA underwrote a number of research 
projects designed to encourage the forensic application of scientific 
knowledge; the admissibility of some techniques can be traced 
directly to this research. Voiceprint analysis is ·the best example.l2 
Other funded projects dealt with blood analysis, 13 blood flight 
characteristics, 14 trace metal detection, 15 and polygraphy.16 Cur-
rently, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is spending a 
considerable amount of resources on the forensic application of de-
oxyribonucleic acid (DNA). 
B. Supreme Court Influence 
Several writers have found a different reason. They attribute 
the expanded use of scientific evidence to Supreme Court decisions 
of the 1960's, in which the Warren Court severely restricted the 
acquisition of eviden<;e for criminal cases via traditional crime-
solving techniques, such as interrogations and lineups.17 For 
example, commentators have written "Miranda, Gideon, Escobedo, 
12 NATIONAL INsTITUTE OF LAw ENFORCEMENT & CRIMINAL JusTICE, VOICE 
IDENTIFICATION RESEARCH _(1972) (submitted to LEAA by Michigan State Police) 
[hereinafter VOICE IDENTIFICATION RESEARCH]. 
13 B. GULLIFORD, THE EXAMINATION AND TYPING OF BLOODSTAINS IN THE 
CRIME LABoRATORY (1971). 
14 NATIONAL INSTITUTE oF LAw ENFORCEMENT & CRIMINAL JusTICE, TRAcE 
METAL DETECTION TEcHNIQUE IN LAw ENFORCEMENT (Oct. 1970). 
15 D. RAsKIN ET AL., VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY OF DETECTION OF DECEPTION 
(1978). 
16Jd. 
17 See Kelley, Foreword to R. Fox & C. CUNNINGHAM, CRIME ScENE SEARCH 
AND PHYsiCAL EVIDENCE HANDBOOK at iii (1973); Fong, Criminalistics and the 
Prosecutor, in THE PRosECUTOR's DESKBOOK 547 (P. Healy & J. Manak eds. 1971). 
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and several other cases of similar import, indirectly created an 
entirely new approach to criminal investigation. This has been 
particularly true with regard to the use and application of the 
various forensic sciences .... "18 In 1972, an appellate judge wrote, 
"In this day and age ... where recent decisions of the United States 
Supreme Court establish stringent guidelines in the investigative, 
custodial and prosecutional areas a premium is placed upon the 
development and use of scientific methods of crime detection."19 
There is some suggestion in the Supreme Court's cases that 
supports this view. For· example, in one case the Court wrote, 
"Modern community living requires modern scientific methods of 
crime detection lest the public go unprotected."2° In Escobedo the 
Court wrote, 
We have learned the lesson of history, ancient and 
modern, that a system of criminal law enforcement 
which comes to depend on the "confession" will, in the 
long run, be less reliable and more subject to abuses 
than a system which depends on extrinsic evidence 
independently secured through skillful investigation. 21 
Interestingly, while the Court was erecting constitutional 
bamers to the use of confessions and lineups, it was removing 
Fourth and Fifth Amendment obstacles to the use of scientific 
evidence. The most important case was Schmerber v. California. 22 
The Court, in an opinion by Justice Brennan, held that the 
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination applied only to 
testimonial evidence, and not to physical evidence. Therefore, the 
police could extract blood from Schmerber for blood-alcohol analysis 
without violating the Fifth Amendment privilege. This ruling also 
meant that law enforcement officials could compel a suspect to 
provide handwriting exemplars, fingerprints, and voice 
exemplars-and now biological samples for DNA testing-without 
running afoul of the Self-Incrilnination Clause.23 
Several Fourth Amendment cases also had an impact on the 
use of scientific evidence. In Warden v. Hayden24 the Supreme 
Court overruled its prior cases, which had prohibited the seizure of 
18 Fox et al., The Criminalistics Mission: A Comment, in LEGAL MEDICINE 
ANNuAL 1 (C. Wecht ed. 1972). 
19Worley v. State, 263 So. 2d 613, 616 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (concurring 
opinion). 
20Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 439 (1957). 
21Escobedo v. illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 488-89 (1964). 
22 384 u.s. 757 (1966). 
23 See P. GIANNELLI & E. lMwiN:KELRIED, supra note 9, ch. 2. 
24 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (Brennan, J.). 
172 MILITARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 137 
"mere evidence." Under the "mere evidence" rule, the police could 
seize only contraband, instrumentalities of a crime, or fruits of a 
crime. Most scientific evidence would have been "mere evidence" 
and thereby excluded under this rule. 
The Warren Court also was the first Court to sanction stop-
and-frisk procedures by the police.25 Later, in Davis v. Mis-
sissippi,26 Justice Brennan suggested that the seizure of a person, 
on less than probable cause, for the purpose of obtaining 
fingerprints may not violate the Fourth Amendment under certain 
circumstances.27 This dictum led to the adoption in a number of 
jurisdictions of what are known as "nontestimonial identification" 
procedures. Under these provisions, a suspect judicially may be 
ordered to provide handwriting, voice, and fingerprint exemplars-
and perhaps biological samples for DNA testing-based on 
reasonable suspicion, rather than on probable cause.2s 
C. The Technological Age 
I am not sure, however, that either of these reasons-research 
funding or Supreme Court decisions-explains fully the increased 
use of scientific evidence. The answer may be more basic. That a 
society so dependent on science and technology should turn to such 
knowledge as a method of proof should not be very surprising. With 
computer technology running our businesses, magnetic resonance 
imaging aiding medicine, and the marvel of twentieth-century 
technology-Nintendo-captivating our kids, no one sh_ould be very 
surprised to see DNA evidence in the courtroom. 
D. Reliability 
In addition, it is the perceived reliability of scientific proof 
that makes it so attractive and explains its increased use. 
Fingerprints are simply more reliable than many eyewitness 
identifications. Lawyers and juries know this. A 1974 survey of 
25 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
26 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969); see also Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811 (1985) 
(noting the Dauis dictum). 
27 Later cases by the Court also facilitated the use of scientific evidence. In 
United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973), and United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 
19 (1973), the Court held that physical characteristics, such as handwriting and 
the sound of a person's voice, fell outside the Fourth Amendment's protection 
against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Court also held that the 
compelled production of voice and handwriting exemplars pursuant to a grand 
jury subpoena did not constitute a seizure of the person within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment. 
28 P. GIANNELLI & E. IMwiNKELRIED, supra note 9, ch. 2. 
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1363 judges and lawyers throughout the United States found that 
"[s]eventy-five percent . . . stated that they believed judges accord 
scientific evidence more credibility than other evidence, and 70 
percent believed that juries also find scientific evidence more 
credible."29 A more recent survey of jurors reported, "About one 
quarter of the citizens who had served on juries which were 
presented with scientific evidence believed that had such evidence 
been absent, they would have changed their verdicts from guilty to 
not guilty."30 
III. Novel Scientific Evidence 
The first article that I wrote on scientific evidence concerned 
the admissibility of novel scientific evidence-that is, scientifically-
based evidence that had not yet been admitted in court.31 That 
article critiqued the two major evidentiary tests on the issue. The 
first test is based oil Frye u. United States32 and requires the basis 
of expert testimony to be generally accepted by the scientific 
community. Under this standard, it is not enough that a qualified 
expert--or even several experts-testifies that a particular tech-
nique is valid. Frye imposes a special burden-"general acceptance" 
in the field. 
The alternative approach is what I have described as the 
relevancy test, which can be traced to Professor McCormick. 33 
Under this test, the evidence need not be "generally accepted." It 
need only be relevant, which in this context means reliable. The 
critical difference between these two tests is that Frye is more 
conservative-something its detractors lament and its supporters 
applaud. 
This issue remains critical today in the DNA cases. A recent 
Second Circuit opinion, United States u. Jakobetz,34 in January 
1992, rejected the Frye test and admitted DNA. Interestingly, five 
months earlier, the Fifth Circuit not only had reaffirmed Frye in 
Christophersen u. Allied-Signal Corp.,35 but also had applied it in 
29 M. SAKS & R. VAN DmzEND, THE UsE oF SciENTIFic EVIDENCE IN 
LITIGATION 5-6 (1983). 
30Peterson et al., The Uses, and Effects of Forensic Science in the 
Adjudication of Felony Cases, 32 J. FoRENSIC Sci. 1730, 1748 (1987). 
31 Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United 
States, a Half-Century Later, 80 CoLUM. L. REv. 1197 (1980). 
32 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
33 C. McCORMICK, EVIDENCE 363-64 (1954). 
34 United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1992). 
35 939 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1280 (1992). 
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a civil case; this was a major expansion.36 A proposed amendment 
to Federal Evidence Rule 702, which is presently under considera-
tion, would adopt a compromise position, requiring expert testi-
mony to be based on information that is "reasonably reliable." 
In my article, I criticized both tests; but then I proposed an 
alternate, yet restrictive, test. In a criminal case, the prosecution 
should be required to satisfy a high burden of proof when offering 
novel scientific evidence. Some examples illustrate why. 
A The Paraffin Test 
The paraffin test is a gunshot residue (GSR) test designed to 
detect the presence of nitrates on the hands of a person suspected 
of firing a rifle or handgun. Nitrates come from smokeless 
powder-the propellant in modern ammunition-and often are 
deposited on the hand from the backblast of gases that escape 
during discharge. Paraffin was used to remove the residues. 
Knowing whether someone had recently fired a weapon is often 
significant in suspected suicides, self-defense, and other cases. 
The "paraffin test" first was introduced into this country in 
the 1930's and was adopted quickly by law enforcement agencies. 37 
A 1935 article in the F.B.I. Law Enforcement Bulletin spoke of the 
"current widespread use" of this test. 38 The first reported case 
admitting evidence based on the paraffin test was decided in 
1936,39 and other cases followed this precedent. 40 
The first comprehensive study of the paraffin test, however, 
was not published until 1967-thirty years after the first court 
case.4 1 From that study, we learned that many common substances 
other than gunshot residues contain nitrates. "(R]ust,' colored 
fingernail polishes, residue from evaporated urine, soap and tap 
water" all tested positive. 42 In short, the test was nonspecific. 
36 1 D. LoUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE 853 (1977) ("The Frye 
standard ... is rarely applied in civil litigation"). 
37Matthews, The Paraffin Test, 102 AMERICAN RIFLEMAN 20 (1954). 
38Diphenylamine Test for Gun Powder, 4 F.B.I. L. ENFORCEMENT BULL. 5 
(1935). Diphenylamine was the reagent used in the test. 
39 Commonwealth v. Westwood, 324 Pa. 289, 188 A. 304 (1936). 
40 See P. GIANNELLI & E. !MwrnKELRIED, supra note 9, at 413 (listing cases). 
41 An earlier but smaller study was published in 1955. Turkel & Lipman, 
Unreliability of Dermal Nitrate Test for Gunpowder, 46 J. CRIME, CRIMINOLOGY & 
PoLicE Sci. 281, 282 (1955). 
42 Cowan & Purdon, A Study of the "Paraffin Test," 12 J. FoRENSIC Sci. 19, 
23 (1967). 
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Why did so much time pass before conducting this study? Why 
did courts continue to admit this evidence, even after the 
publication of this study? 
B. Voiceprints 
My second example is voiceprint evidence, which confronted 
the courts in the 1970's. A voiceprint was used to identify a 
speaker's tape-recorded voice by means of sound spectrometry. 
Voiceprint evidence was admitted readily after the publication of a 
1972 Michigan State University study, which was funded by the 
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration.4 3 In that study, 
34,992 experimental trials, involving 250 male speakers and 
twenty-nine examiners were conducted over a two-year period. 
False identifications occurred in approximately six_ percent of the 
trials that most closely resembled the forensic situation. The error · 
rate is reduced to approximately two percent if the trials in which 
the examiners expressed "uncertainty" about their conclusions are 
eliminated. 
Dr. Oscar Tosi, who supervised this study, testified that the 
error rate would be "negligible" in a real-life situation.44 Based on 
this study, many courts admitted voiceprint evidence. Other courts 
disagreed, and a war over admissibility was waged for most of the 
decade.45 In 1979, the National Academy of Sciences published its 
report on the subject. The report raised significant doubts about 
voiceprint identifications. One passage stated, 
Estimates of error rates now available pertain to only a 
few of the many combinations of conditions encountered 
in real-life situations. These estimates do not constitute 
a generally adequate basis for a judicial or legislative 
body to use in making judgments concerning the 
reliability and acceptability of aural-visual voice identi-
fication in forensic applications. 46 
As with the paraffin test, the court cases came first and then the 
independent scientific report followed. 
43 VOICE IDENTIFICATION RESEARCH, supra note 12. 
44 People v. Law, 40 Cal. App. 3d 69, 78, 114 Cal. Rptr. 708, 713 (1974). 
45 P. GIANNELLI & E. lMwiNKELRIED, supra note 9, at 322-23 (listing cases). 
46 NATIONAL AcADEMY OF SciENCES, ON THE THEoRY AND PRACTICE OF 
VOicE IDENTIFICATION 60 (1979). 
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C. Hypnotically-Refreshed Testimony 
In the 1980's, the major dispute involving the admissibility of 
scientific evidence concerned the testimony of witnesses whose 
memories had been refreshed by hypnosis. Finding the evidence 
reliable, numerous courts admitted hypnotically-refreshed testi-
mony.47 Some of these courts said that hypnosis was merely 
another way to refresh memory. Other courts, however, rejected 
this evidence, holding that its use is so fraught with danger that a 
witness becomes incompetent once hypnotized. 48 
In 1985, the American Medical Association issued a report 
that seriously questioned the accuracy of this type of testimony. 
The report stated, 
Review of the scientific literature indicates that when 
hypnosis is used to refresh recollection, one of the 
following outcomes occurs: (1) hypnosis produces recollec-
tions that are not substantially different from nonhypno-
tic recollections; (2) it yields recollections that are more 
inaccurate than nonhypnotic memory; or, most fre-
quently, (3) it results in more information being 
reported, but these recollections contain both accurate 
and inaccurate details. When the third condition results, 
the individual is less likely to be able to discriminate 
between accurate and inaccurate recollections. There are 
no data to support a fourth alternative, namely, that 
hypnosis increases remembering of only accurate 
information. 49 
Again, the same pattern reappears. Long after the battle over 
admissibility-had erupted in the courtroom, an independent group 
of experts issued a report on the subject. Should not the report 
come before the admission of the evidence? 
IV. Reliability of Routine Procedures 
Now I would like to turn to expert testimony based on 
"routine" procedures. 
47 See P. GIANNELLI & E. IMwrNKELRIED, supra note 9, ch. 12 (listing cases). 
4B[d. 
49 American Medical Association Council on Scientific Affairs, Scientific 
Status of Refreshing Recollection by the Use of Hypnosis, 253 JAMA 1918, 1921 
(1985). 
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A Fingerprints 
AB illustrated by several fingerprint cases, even the most 
basic techniques are subject to error. For example, in Imbler v. 
Craven,50 the expert failed to observe an exculpatory fingerprint in 
a murder case in which the death penalty was imposed. In another 
murder case, State v. Caldwell,51 the court wrote, "The fingerprint 
expert's testimony was damning-and it was false."52 
B. Firearms Identification 
In February 1989, the Los Angeles Police arrested Rickey 
Ross for the murder of three prostitutes. An expert who was the 
head of the Department's Firearms Identification Division made a 
positive identification after compari.llg the murder bullets and a 
bullet fired from Ross's nine-millimeter Smith & Wesson. One of 
the defense attorneys later admitted, "I suppose I was like the 
average citizen. They said it was a match, I thought it was like a 
fingerprint."53 Based on the same evidence, however, a defense 
expert reached the opposite conclusion-that is, Ross's gun could 
not have fired the fatal bullets. Two independent experts came to 
yet another conclusion-namely, insufficient evidence existed to 
draw any conclusions. The case against Ross was dropped. 
This was not the first time that the Los Angeles crime 
laboratory had stumbled. A prior misidentification occurred in the 
investigation of Sirhan Sirhan for the assassination of Bobby 
Kennedy. 
In [People v. Sirhan,] seven independent examiners were 
appointed by the presiding judge of the Superior Court of 
Los Angeles County to reexamine the purported firearms 
bullet comparison post trial. The examiners were 
unanimous in their findings that the identification 
testified to at the grand jury indictment and in the trial 
were misrepresented in that the purported identification 
of bullets lodged in victim Kennedy ... with Sirhan's gun 
50 298 F. Supp. 795 (C.D. Cal. 1969), affd, 424 F.2d 631 (9th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 400 U.S. 865 (1970). 
51 322 N.W.2d 574 (Minn. 1982). 
52/d. at 586; see also Starrs, A Miscue in Fingerprint Identification: Causes 
and Concerns, 12 J. POLICE Sci. & ADMIN. 287 (1984). 
53 Baker & Lieberman, Faulty Ballistics in Deputy's Arrest; Eagerness to 
"Make" Gun Cited in LAPD Lab Error, L.A. TIMEs, May 22, 1989, at 1, col. 1; 
Freed, LAPD Probing What Went Wrong With Ballistics Tests on Ross' Gun, LA. 
TIMEs, May 16, 1989, at 26, col. 1. 
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were nonexistent. In both of these cases discovery and 
cross examination were lacking.54 
In a third case, In re Kirschke,55 the firearms identification 
ex1--ert made a conclusive identification. On appeal, the court 
concluded that the expert had "negligently presented false 
demonstrative evidence in support of his ballistics testimony."56 
C. Proficiency Testing 
Unfortunately, these cases do not represent isolated mistakes. 
A limited, but nevertheless revealing, survey of lawyers and 
scientists associated with the American Academy of Forensic 
Sciences identified "competency'' as the most significant ethical 
problem in the field. 57 Other problems considered significant in the 
survey included "the failure of scientists to express both the 
strengths and weaknesses of their data, giving opinions which 
exceed the limits of their data, and a failure to remain objective in 
their evaluation of evidence and delivery of testimony."58 
Moreover, proficiency test results of many common laboratory 
examinations are disturbing. Seventy-one percent of the crime 
laboratories tested provided unacceptable results in a blood test, 
51.4% made errors in matching paint samples, 35.5% erred in a 
soil examination, and 28.2% made mistakes in firearms identifica-
tions.59 A review of five handwriting comparison proficiency tests 
showed that, at best, "[d]ocument examiners were correct 57% of 
the time and incorrect 43% of the time."6° One of the authors of a 
major proficiency test commented, 
In spite of being a firm advocate of forensic science, I 
must acknowledge that a disturbingly high percentage of 
laboratories are not performing routine tests competently 
. . . . The startling conclusions from that research led to 
some efforts to improve conditions in the laboratories, 
54 Bradford, Forensic Firearms Identification: Competence or Incompetence, 5 
FoRUM 14 (1978). 
55 53 Cal. App. 3d 405, 125 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 820 
(1976). 
56 I d. at 408, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 682. 
57Peterson & Murdock, Forensic Sciences Ethics: Developing an Integrated 
System of Support and Enforcement, 34 J. FoRENSIC Sci. 749, 751 (1989). 
58 I d. at 752. 
59J. PETERSON ET AL., CRIME LABoRATORY PRoFICIENCY TEsTING RESEARCH 
PROGRAM 251 (1978). 
60 Risinger et al., Exorcism of Ignorance as a Proxy For Rational Knowledge: 
The Lessons of Handwriting Identification "Expertise," 137 U. PA. L. REv. 731, 748 
(1989). 
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but these encounter institutional inertia against 
reform.61 
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Consequently, "[a]t present, forensic science is virtually 
unregulated-with the paradoxical result that clinical laboratories 
must meet higher standards to be allowed to diagnose strep throat 
than forensic labs must meet to put a defendant on death row."62 
In a recent article on crime laboratories, Professor Jonkait 
concluded, 
All available information indicates that forensic 
science laboratories perform poorly .... Current regulation 
of clinical labs indicates that a regulatory system can 
improve crime laboratories .... [F]orensic facilities should 
at least be required to undergo mandatory, blind 
proficiency testing, and the results of this testing should 
be made public. 63 
This information about the reliability of routine tests should 
affect a number of legal issues-for example, ( 1) whether our 
current rules on pretrial discovery are adequate,64 and (2) whether 
laboratory reports should be admitted into evidence in lieu of 
expert testimony.65 
V. Fraud, Perjury, and Misconduct 
A Experts 
In a number of cases, experts have gone beyond negligence. 
For example, a surprising number of expert witnesses have lied 
about their credentials.66 In one case, an FBI serologist testified 
that he had a master's degree in science, "whereas in fact he never 
61 Symposium on Science and the Rules of Legal Procedure, 101 F.R.D. 599, 
645 (1984) (remarks of Professor Joseph Peterson). For a more detailed discussion 
of proficiency testing, see Saks, Prevalence and Impact of Ethical Problems in 
Forensic Science, 34 J. FoRENSIC Sci. 772, 775-78 (1989) (reviewing proficiency 
testing results) ("Perhaps the major lessons to be drawn from this are that errors 
are indeed made and that there is a wide range of interlaboratory variation"). 
62 Lander, DNA Fingerprinting On Trial, 339 NATURE 501, 505 (1989). 
63 Jonakait, Forensic Science: The Need for Regulation, 4 HARv. J. L. & 
TEcH. 109, 191 (1991). 
64See Giannelli, Criminal Discovery, Scientific Evidence. and DNA, 44 
VAND. L. REv. 791 (1991). 
65 Giannelli, The Admissibility of Laboratory Reports in Criminal Trials: The 
Reliability of Scientific Proof, 49 Omo ST. L.J. 671 (1988). 
66 See Saks, Prevalence and Impact of Ethical Problems in Forensic Science, 
34 J. FoRENSIC Sci. 772 (1989) (listing other cases); Annotation, Perjury or 
Wilfully False Testimony of Expert Witness as Basis for New Trial on Ground of 
Newly Discovered Evidence, 38 A.L.R.3d 812 (1971). 
180 MILITARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 137 
attained a graduate degree."67 In another case, the death penalty 
was vacated when evidence was discovered that a prosecution 
expert, who ''had testified in many cases," had lied about her 
professional qualifications. "[S]he had never fulfilled the educa-
tional requirements for a laboratory technician."68 Other examples 
include a serologist who testified falsely about his academic 
credentials;69 a psychologist who was convicted of pe:tjury for 
claiming, during the Ted Bundy trial, that he had a doctorate 
degree;7o an arson expert who testified falsely about his academic 
credentials;71 a lab technician convicted of peijury for misrepre-
senting his educational background;72 and a lab analyst who 
pleaded guilty to eight counts of falsification for misstating his 
academic credentials. 73 
Perhaps the most striking illustration is a firearms expert 
who took some credit for "the development of penicillin, the 'Pap' 
smear, and to top it all off, the atomic bomb."74 Professor Starrs, 
who has examined these cases in depth, has proposed discovery as 
the remedy for this type of fraud.75 
Another type of misconduct is illustrated by the ''Maguire 
Case" in Great Britain. The Maguires were accused of possessing 
an explosive as part of the Irish Republican Army's terrorism 
campaign. The prosecution relied on scientific evidence. Professor 
Starrs has provided us with the following summary: 
The government built its case on the traces of [nitro-
glycerine] under the fingernails of six of the defendants 
and on the plastic gloves belonging to Mrs. Maguire. 
"The evidence was almost entirely scientific." . . . The 
prosecution made much of the fact that [thin layer 
chromatography] will identify [nitroglycerine] to the 
exclusion of other substances, explosive and non-
explosive. The tests were said to be as conclusive and 
irrefutable as fingerprints. The entire underpinnings for 
67Doepel v. United States, 434 A.2d 449, 460 (D.C. App.), cert. denied, 454 
U.S. 1037 (1981). 
68 Commonwealth v. Mount, 435 Pa. 419, 422, 257 A.2d 578, 579 (1969). 
69Maddox v. Lord, 818 F.2d 1058, 1062 (2d Cir. 1987). 
70Kline v. State, 444 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984). 
71 People v. Alfano, 95 III. App. 3d 1026, 1028-29, 420 N.E.2d 1114, 1116 
(1983). 
72 State v. Elder, 199 Kan. 607, 433 P.2d 462 (1967). 
73 State v. DeFronzo, 59 Ohio Misc. 113, 116, 394 N.E.2d 1027, 1030 (C.P. 
1978). 
74 Starrs, Mountebanks Among Forensic Scientists, in 2 FoRENSIC SciENCE 
IlANDBooK 1, 7, 20-29 (R. Saferstein ed. 1988). 
75/d. at 31. 
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this assertion was proved not only to be scientifically 
false but also known to be so by all concerned parties 
and scientists by the trial's eleventh hour discovery of an 
intra-Dab] memorandum dated six months prior to the 
Maguires' arrest. 76 
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Another example occurred in 1970, when a federal grand jury 
in Chicago investigated the deaths of Black Panther leaders in a 
police raid. The grand jury report noted that the "testimony of the 
firearms examiner that he could not have refused to sign what he 
believed was an inadequate and preliminary report on pain of 
potential discharge is highly alarming. If true, it could undermine 
public confidence in all scientific analysis performed by this 
agency."77 
B. Attorneys 
Attorneys also have misused expert and scientific evidence. 
Perhaps the most flagrant abuse was the prosecutor in Miller v. 
Pate.7B A prosecution expert had testified that stains on underwear 
shorts were type-A blood, which matched the defendant's blood 
type. The prosecutor waived the ''bloody'' shorts in front of the jury 
in closing argument. Later proceedings established that the stains 
were paint-not blood-and that the prosecutor knew this fact at 
the time of trial. 
Another type of prosecutorial misconduct involves improper 
attempts to pressure experts into changing or modifying their 
opinions. In a recent case involving a federal grand jury, the 
Supreme Court noted that the "District Court further concluded 
that one of the prosecutors improperly argued with an expert 
witness during a recess of the grand jury after the witness gave 
testimony adverse to the government."79 
A different type of misconduct is illustrated by the controver-
sial Sacco and V anzetti case. Sacco and V anzetti were charged with 
murder during a payroll robbery in 1921. Many believe their 
executions resulted more from their foreign statuses and "radical" 
beliefs than from the cogency of the evidence presented against 
76 Starrs, The Forensic Scientist and the Open Mind, 31 J. FoRENSIC Sci. 
Soc'y 111, 141-42 (1991) (citing May et al., Interim Report on the Maguire Case, 
London: HMSO (12 July 1990)). 
77 Bradford, Problems of Ethics and Behavior in the Forensic Sciences, 21 J. 
FoRENSIC Sci. 763, 767 (1976) (quoting U.S. Dist. Ct., N.D. Ill., E. Div., Report of 
January 1970 Grand Jury 121). 
78 386 u.s. 1 (1967). 
79Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250 (1988). 
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them. Firearms identification evidence was critical. Professor 
Morgan has commented on this issue. 
On October 23 Captain Proctor made an affidavit 
indicating that he had repeatedly told [the prosecutor] 
that he would have to answer in the negative if he were 
asked whether he had found positive evidence that the 
fatal bullet had been fired from Sacco's pistol. The 
statement which Proctor made on the witness stand was: 
''My opinion is that it is consistent with being fired by 
that pistol."BO 
If this passage is true, then the prosecution intentionally misled 
the jury. 
VI. Problem Areas 
In researching scientific evidence issues, a number of 
recurring problems have tended to surface. I will mention several 
such issues, though I am sure more exist. 
A. Technology Transfer 
One of the attacks on DNA evidence has focused on the issue 
of "technology transfer"-that is, DNA has been used in scientific 
research for a number of purposes, but not for the purpose for 
which it is being used in criminal trials. The argument is quite 
simple. Specifically, just because DNA is valid for some purposes 
does not necessarily mean that it is valid for a different purpose. 
This is a recurring issue in the forensic sciences. For example, 
the American Medical Association had recognized hypnosis as an 
accepted medical technique for psychotherapy, treatment of 
psychosomatic illnesses, and amnesia. 8 1 In this context, hypnosis 
can be "therapeutically useful, [and yet] it need not produce 
historically accurate memory."B2 The use of hypnosis to refresh 
recollection at trial is a very different thing because its use 
depends on whether it can produce accurate memory. 
Similarly, the initial research on rape trauma syndrome was 
developed to aid rape victims. "[R]ape trauma syndrome was not 
devised to determine the 'truth' or 'accuracy' of a particular past 
event-i.e., whether, in fact, a rape in the legal sense occurred-
80 L. JouGHIN & E. MORGAN, THE LEGACY OF SACCO & VANZE'ITI 15 (1948). 
81 Council on Mental Health, Medial Use of Hypnosis, 168 JAMA 186 (1958). 
82 State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764, 768 (Minn. 1980). 
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but rather was developed by professional rape counselors as a 
therapeutic tool, to help identifY, predict and treat emotional 
problems experienced by the counselor's clients or patients."B3 
This research still, however, may be useful in a criminal trial. 
Rape trauma syndrome evidence may be helpful if the defendant 
suggests to the jury that the conduct of the victim after the 
incident-such as a delay in reporting the assault-is inconsistent 
with the claim of rape. In this situation, "expert testimony on rape 
trauma syndrome may play a particularly useful role by disabusing 
the jury of some widely held misconceptions about rape and rape 
victims, so that it may evaluate the evidence free of . . . popular 
myths."84 
B. Subjectivity 
A number of routine forensic techniques are essentially 
subjective. Firearms identification is an example. Even though 
based on objective data-such as striation marks on a bullet-the 
conclusion about a match comes down to the examiner's subjective 
judgment. Questioned documents, bite marks, and even fin-
gerprints fall into the same category. 
Subjectivity also may be a problem when instrumentation is 
used. For example, the polygraph technique-although employing 
an instrument-involves a large dose of subjectivity. Indeed, some 
courts have rejected polygraph results because of this factor. 
According to one court, the polygraph technique "albeit based on a 
scientific theory, remains an art with unusual responsibility placed 
on the examiner."B5 Another court spoke of the "almost total 
subjectiveness surrounding the use of the polygraph and the 
interpretation of the results."B6 The use of DNA evidence also 
involves subjectivity if a "match" is declared based only on "eye-
balling'' the autorads. 87 
I do not equate "subjective" with ''bad" or "invalid." As I noted 
before, fingerprints are-in this sense-subjective, but they are 
also very reliable. Subjectivity, however, necessarily means that 
83 People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 249-50, 681 P.2d 291, 300, 203 Cal. 
Rptr. 450, 459 (1984). 
84ld. at 247-48, 681 P.2d at 298, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 457. 
85 People v. Anderson, 637 P.2d 354, 360 (Colo. 1981). 
86People v. Monigan, 72 ill. App. 3d 87, 98, 390 N.E.2d 562, 569 (1979). 
87 See Thompson & Ford, DNA Typing: Acceptance and Weight of the New 
Genetic Identification Tests, 75 VA. L. REv. 45, 88 (1989) ("There are currently no 
formal standards for determining what constitutes a match between two DNA 
prints. Whether a match is declared between two prints is a subjective judgment 
for the forensic expert"). 
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room for disagreement exists-specifically, the greater the subjec-
tivity, the greater the chance for error. 
C. Statistical Evidence 
In contrast to the "subjective" techniques, a number of 
techniques are based upon statistics. As one commentator has 
noted, "The results of forensic tests are often meaningful only if 
they are accompanied by statistical data."ss Neutron activation, 
electrophoretic blood testing, and DNA are examples. 
Often, this type of evidence can be misused. If, for example, 
the expert testifies that the perpetrator and the defendant share a 
blood type found in five percent of the population, a juror might 
conclude that a ninety-five-percent chance exists that the defend-
ant is guilty.89 Such a conclusion would not be warranted. If a 
million people lived in the city where the crime occurred, 50,000 
people would share this blood type. Can the defense then argue 
that the probability of guilt is therefore one in 50,000? This is also 
misleading. 90 
These are relatively easy issues compared to the problems 
with DNA evidence, over which some scientists argue that the loci 
used in the analysis have not been proved to be independent. If 
they are not independent, then the product rule cannot be used to 
compute an overall probability. 
Let me simply conclude first by saying that lawyers must 
understand probabilistic reasoning, and second by citing an article 
by Professor McCord, entitled "A Primer for the Non-
mathematically Inclined on Mathematical Evidence in Criminal 
Cases: People u. Collins and Beyond."91 
D. Misleading and Ambiguous Conclusions 
Pay close attention to an expert's conclusion. As mentioned 
earlier, the firearms identification expert in the Sacco and Vanzetti 
case testified that the bullet was "consistent with" having been 
fired by Sacco's gun. Apparently, the defense counsel and judge 
88 Thompson, Are Juries Competent to Evaluate Statistical Evidence?, 52 
LAw & CoNTEMP. PRoBs. 9 (1989). 
89Id. at 25. 
90Id. at 31. 
91 McCord, A Primer for the Nonmathematically Inclined on Mathematical 
Evidence in Criminal Cases: People v. Collins and Beyond, 47 WABH. & LEE L. 
REv. 741 (1990); see also Mark & Workman, Pitfalls of Statistics, Part I, 6 
SPECTROSCOPY 42 (1991). 
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believed that a positive identification was being made. It was not. 
Hundreds or thousands of weapons may have fired that bullet. 
Experts in the neutron activation cases have testified that (1) 
samples "were of the same type and same manufacture";92 (2) hair 
samples "came from the same source";93 (3) blood analysis revealed 
a "match of the materials";94 (4) samples had a "common origin or 
source";95 and (5) hair samples "were identical and probably came 
from the same person."96 What does this testimony mean? Might 
not a jury believe that a positive identification is being made? 
E. Destruction of Evidence and Chain of Custody 
In researching cases on chain of custody issues, I came across 
a surprising number of cases in which evidence was lost or 
destroyed. A review of the cases reveals that drugs, bullets, blood, 
urine, and trace metal detection results, as well as physical 
evidence of arson, rape, and homicide, have not been preserved for 
examination or retesting. 97 
Perhaps the most bizarre illustration is People v. Morgan,9B in 
which a severed fingertip was found at the scene of a homicide. It 
was not the victim's. Through insightful police work-that is, 
looking for someone with a missing fingertip--Morgan sans 
fingertip became a suspect. The defense moved pretrial to examine 
the fingertip. The fingertip, however, could not be located. 
Accordingly, the Colorado Supreme Court held that the prosecution 
could not use the fingertip evidence at trial. The court does not tell 
us what happened, but a news report does. The refrigerator in 
which the evidence was stored apparently was not cold enough to 
prevent decay and the police refused to move the fingertip to the 
refrigerator in which they stored their ''brown bag lunches." 
Accordingly, "someone-the police haven't been able to determine 
who-threw the fingertip away."99 
92United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431, 436 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 
u.s. 994 (1971). 
93People v. Collins, 43 Mich. App. 259, 264, 204 N.W.2d 290, 293 (1972). 
94 State v. Stout, 478 S.W.2d 368, 368 (Mo. 1972). 
95 State v. Coolidge, 109 N.H. 403, 421, 260 A2d 547, 560 (1969), rev'd on 
other grounds, 404 U.S. 443 (1972). 
96Ward v. State, 427 S.W.2d 876, 884 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968). 
97 See P. GIANNELLI & E. IMwiNKELRIED, supra note 9, at 108-09 (collecting 
cases). 
9a 199 Colo. 237, 606 P.2d 1296 (1980). 
99Moya, The Case of the Missing Fingertip, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 21, 1981, at 11. 
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VII. Conclusion 
In conclusion, let me make two points. First, despite my 
criticisms today about how scientific evidence often is misused in 
the courtroom, I am a strong proponent of scientific proof. It is 
often better than eyewitness testimQny and credibility battles-the 
''he said, she said" testimony often encountered in rape trials. 
Moreover, an innocent person may · be exonerated because of 
scientific evidence. 
Second, problems with experts are not new. In 1843, an 
English judge wrote that "skilled witnesses come with such a bias 
in their minds to support the case in which they are embarked that 
hardly any weight should be given to their evidence."loo In 1899, 
the Minnesota Supreme Court observed that "[t]here is hardly 
anything, not palpably absurd on its face, that cannot now be 
proved by some so-called 'expert."'101 
100 Tracy Peerage Case, 10 Cl. & F. 154, 191 (1984). 
101 Keegan v. Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co., 76 Minn. 90, 95, 78 N.W. 
965, 966 (1899). 
